muslim-brotherhood
Muslim Brotherhood
On December 18, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia self-immolated, igniting what would become the Arab Spring—a regional revolution challenging power structures across the Middle East. Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was the first leader to fall, followed by Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, and Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh. Meanwhile, Syria’s Bashar Al-Assad struggles to maintain his grip on power amid a massive, full-scale revolt. Initially, the movement garnered widespread support from both the Middle East and the West, but the sentiment has shifted dramatically. Coordinated attacks on American, British, and other Western embassies, the assassinations of liberal opposition figures like Tunisia’s Chokri Belaid,[^1] and the staggering death toll of seventy thousand in Syria’s ongoing conflict have contributed to a more somber outlook. Perhaps most concerning is the rise of autocracy and authoritarianism within Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood at the domestic level. Amidst these developments, Israel's role in the Middle East and its ability to integrate with neighboring countries and evolving leadership remains uncertain. This paper aims to analyze the role of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in relation to Israel's integration into the region. It will explore the ideology of the organization's founder, its history as both an opposition and social activism group, and its ongoing transformation into an Islamic entity responsible for the sovereign nation of Egypt. Much remains to be determined, and as any analyst would note, the entire political landscape can shift dramatically with an unforeseen event. The Muslim Brotherhood stands out as a remarkable example of resilience, having endured persecution, periods of irrelevance, and moments of powerlessness. With the election of Mohammad Morsi in 2012, the Brotherhood finally stepped into the role they had long sought, only to discover that governing was far more complex than being in opposition. In many ways, their tenure exacerbated the already deteriorating economic and political landscape around them. While Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood have experienced moments of strength—such as their involvement in negotiating the cease-fire between Israel and Hamas during “Operation Pillar of Defense”—they currently lack the decisive actions needed to address the numerous domestic crises unfolding, which limits their ability to exert influence beyond their immediate region. The research for the first part of this paper, which explores the foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood and its history of social activism, includes significant insights on founder Hassan al-Banna and Sayyed Qutb. This analysis draws heavily from historian Mohamad Zaid and Mariz Tadros, a Research Fellow in International Development. Their work is complemented by broader discussions on the role of Islam, mobilizing activism, and sustaining religious dialogue, as presented by Mansoor Moaddel and Carrie Rosefsky. Additionally, Yitzhak Reiter’s book, War, Peace and International Relations in Islam, offers valuable analysis of how Islamic jurisprudence, particularly from Egypt’s al-Azhar University, has both supported and hindered Israeli integration into the Middle East. Additionally, Nissim Rejwan’s work, Israel’s Place in the Middle East: A Pluralist Perspective, offers a compelling pathway for the Muslim Brotherhood to foster peace between Egypt and Israel while constructively addressing valid criticisms of Israel. The latter part of this paper draws on current events, primarily news articles from reputable sources and insights from policy analysts discussing developments since the revolution.
Background of the Muslim Brotherhood
The official founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan Al-Banna, grew up in rural Egypt, where he began attending Islamic youth groups at an early age. As a youth activist, he quickly established his leadership credentials at the grassroots level, emphasizing the social significance and enforcement of Islamic values in daily life. When he moved to Cairo in 1924 at the age of 17, he was dismayed by what he perceived as a secular assault on religious values in the city. This experience reinforced his conviction that creating a cohesive Islamic community was a moral imperative. Despite his adherence to the strict Hasafiya Sufism, Al-Banna connected with the Dar ul Loom School of Law at the Islamic institution of Al-Azhar, where he forged relationships with a diverse array of mentors and fellow activists. In 1927, he helped establish the Young Men’s Muslim Association to counter the influence of the popular Christian organization, the Young Men’s Christian Association, while simultaneously managing the Hassafi Welfare Society. Both organizations aimed to replicate the Christian success in spreading ideology through social work. Over time, these initiatives evolved into the Muslim Brotherhood itself, which was formally established in 1928. Al-Banna’s appeal across social classes afforded him the prestigious opportunity to advise Prime Minister Ismail Siddiqi and to have input with King Farouq. This early trust between rulers and grassroots Islamic organizations contributed to the first generation of Brothers being hesitant to engage in politics, as they largely felt their voices were heard and their concerns addressed. The Muslim Brotherhood continues to see itself as an Islamic social organization, extending its influence throughout the region. Although it originated in Egypt, various factions of the movement have adapted the Islamic principles of Hassan al-Banna to suit their local contexts. The Islamic Action Front (IAF) serves as the Jordanian branch of the Brotherhood, merging social activism with political engagement. Notably, it supported the Hashemite monarchy during the Black September conflict in 1970 and gained official control over the Jordanian education system under King Hussein. In their article “Education, Political Participation and Islamist Parties,” Hamed El-Said and James Rauch argue that the IAF’s educational and health initiatives rival those of the Jordanian government in poorer areas, earning popularity by advocating for the rights of the underprivileged and the Palestinian people. The Jordanian-Israeli peace agreement in 1994 sparked IAF opposition to monarchical control, leading to significant political tensions that persist today. In recent protests since 2011, which have temporarily challenged the government, IAF leaders like Nimer Al-Assaf have been at the forefront of critiquing Hashemite rule, addressing secular issues that Jordan faces. Other Muslim Brotherhood organizations, such as Bahrain's Al Wefaq, Morocco's Party of Justice and Development, and to some extent, Palestinian Hamas, share roots in Al-Banna’s ideals, blending social engagement with varying degrees of political activism. The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt following the Arab Spring was perhaps anticipated, and it remains to be seen what direction the movement will ultimately take. The Brotherhood's entire history and public perception have been shaped by its role as a spiritual force at the grassroots level, bolstered by social initiatives that benefit not only its followers but also the broader community. However, despite its legacy of political oppression and its role as the "underdog" facilitating social mobility, the Brotherhood now embodies the very state it has historically opposed. In some respects, it has attempted to position itself as the face of the "Revolution," yet its initial resistance to the protesters and support for the Mubarak regime opens it up to valid criticism. Furthermore, its commitment to avoiding the upper echelons of politics was undermined by the nominations of Khairat Al-Shater and subsequently Mohamed Morsi for president, following Shater's disqualification. The Brotherhood's short-term parliamentary gains have been beneficial, but former Supreme Guide Mahdi Akef acknowledges that many members were losing popular support by failing to articulate their positions to a skeptical public. This was compounded by boycotts from liberal groups like the National Salvation Front, along with promises from other factions to join the boycott. Akef's decree, which granted the presidency powers without judicial oversight, sparked massive protests and set the stage for further dissent, as liberal and even hardline Salafi groups mobilized against what they perceived as a power grab by the Muslim Brotherhood. The future of the Brotherhood remains uncertain, particularly if it cannot navigate the economic crisis gripping Egypt. In the coming months, the movement must redefine its identity and reconcile its leadership role in the nation with its origins as a grassroots social movement.
Social Network of the Muslim Brotherhood
Understanding the social dimension of the Muslim Brotherhood is crucial to grasping its political views and its potential to mobilize followers toward Israeli integration with the region, provided the right conditions and incentives are in place. Al-Bannu consistently emphasized the significance of social context in his writings, highlighting the importance of emotional connections to a common cause—Islam, in this instance. His dedication to the umma, or Islamic community, took precedence over political and economic concerns, fostering connections between the Brotherhood across various nations and regions. His follower and future rival, Sayed Qutb, articulated his vision of umma supremacy in his book “The America I Have Seen.” In it, he criticized the lack of social and emotional awareness in America, highlighting its failure to recognize the suffering of neighbors and fellow humans. Throughout its history, the Brotherhood has emphasized the importance of social connections in building a cohesive Islamic society, which has been a key factor in recruiting and retaining followers. However, the economic and political landscape of Egypt during the Brotherhood's formative years ultimately played to their advantage, especially considering the cycles of growth and decline in prosperity. A significant influence was Gamal Abdel Nasser, who oversaw economic improvements from the 1950s to the mid-1960s, providing citizens with a degree of state support. Numerous technical schools were established, and promising students were sponsored for overseas study, contributing to the rise of an educated middle class. The poor received quality healthcare and food subsidies, while the elite enjoyed priority positions in government and lucrative business deals. Yet, when the economy faltered in 1966, compounded by the disaster of the 1967 Six-Day War, Egypt was forced to accept International Monetary Fund reform measures and work to reduce its substantial debt throughout the 1980s. As a result, virtually all segments of society lost their state benefits, and the Muslim Brotherhood seized the opportunity to capitalize on the misfortunes of what had once been its greatest competitor for recruits. Stepping into its role as a benefactor for the poor, the Brotherhood seized upon events like the 1977 Bread Riots to cultivate a popular base while rallying the professional middle class, who felt aggrieved by the state. This middle class was instrumental in providing the poor with essential healthcare, sustenance, and opportunities, fostering a growing appreciation for the Muslim Brotherhood’s vision of the umma. The interactions between the impoverished and the middle class paved the way for a new societal dynamic, energized by the spiritual refuge of the mosque, which remained largely unchallenged by the State. The government's failure to sustain its generous welfare programs ultimately birthed a new generation of followers for the Muslim Brotherhood—one characterized by a mass following led by well-educated professionals who were well-versed in government institutions and the necessity of social inclusion grounded in Islamic principles.
MB’s Transition into Politics
Al-Banna remained committed to the social mission of the Brotherhood, and his core group largely rejected political ambitions for the movement. Although Al-Banna did engage in politics as an advisor to the Prime Minister and various politicians, his experiences in Cairo—particularly the stark realities of political corruption—deeply influenced him. He became increasingly convinced that political involvement would ultimately jeopardize the integrity of the movement. Banna argued that the most effective path forward was the elimination of political parties, advocating for a single entity—guided by Islamic jurisprudence—with the authority to implement Islamic reform, reminiscent of the Islamic Caliphate. Following the attempted assassination of Nasser by a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, an entire generation within the movement faced persecution, highlighting the perils of intertwining social and political agendas. However, with the rise of Sayed Qutb and later Umar al-Tilemensani, a new cadre of Brothers emerged. This group, while influenced by the past persecution of the 1960s, had not personally experienced it. Led by Tilemensani, they contended that political activism was essential for expanding the movement beyond its stagnant base and challenging the ruling elite's policies. Nasser officially disbanded the organization in 1954, but Tilemensani began filing a barrage of objections and appeals in 1977. Utilizing the regime’s own institutions and political mechanisms to advocate for their cause became a contentious issue among the Brotherhood's old guard, yet it further empowered the new generation, igniting interest in both Islamic and secular law studies. Anwar Sadat, Nasser’s successor, recognized the threat posed by a fully mobilized Muslim Brotherhood opposition but also understood the potential backlash of another crackdown on this popular movement. Consequently, he permitted the Brotherhood to reconvene its headquarters, operate as an official organization with some political activities, and even enlisted their support against other opponents. Although Tilemensani declined many offers that came with restrictions, both the state and the Brotherhood continually adjusted their positions in a bid to balance power and gain the upper hand, all while remaining within established state institutions. The Muslim Brotherhood is not a monolithic entity; it has experienced several splits, including the emergence of the liberal Hizb al-Wasat party, which broke away due to what they perceived as the Brotherhood's dogmatic approach, seeking to better integrate women and Copts into Islamic society. Even the Brotherhood's old guard recognized the potential benefits of gradual acceptance by the state. Tilemensani played a pivotal role in establishing two political entities, Hizb al-Islam al-Misri (Egyptian Reform Party) and Hizb al-Shura (Consultation Party), aimed at providing a political voice for the Brotherhood while maintaining a degree of separation between their social vision and political realities. At one point, the Brotherhood forged connections with secular groups like al-Wafd, despite their earlier refusals, and secured 36 seats in parliament in 1987. Leading up to their rise to power through elections in 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood employed a variety of tactics, including full participation, boycotts, and protest planning, to build a political base in pursuit of their social mission.
The Muslim Brotherhood in the Region and Its Perspective on Israel
The core mission of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is to alleviate suffering through an Islamic framework, which means it is not primarily focused on foreign policy. Hassan al-Banna, the organization's founder, worked to ensure that these engagements did not impede the unity of Islam. The MB's doctrine addresses foreign affairs in a broader, albeit more ambiguous, manner. Nevertheless, Israel has historically been—and continues to be—an increasingly significant and unavoidable topic that the MB must engage with to maintain its relevance. During the 1930s and '40s, much of the Brotherhood's attention was directed toward the Palestinian plight, which was emerging under British control amid rising Jewish immigration. While not explicitly anti-Semitic (and the state of Israel had not yet been established), the MB emphasized the importance of stepping in to provide social services to those displaced or affected by the shifting geopolitical landscape. Following the establishment of Israel and the subsequent wars with Arab nations, much of the direct action and criticism aimed at Israel came from the nation itself and secular Pan-Arabist movements. Although the Muslim Brotherhood intensified its criticism of Israel throughout the 1960s, it found greater value in supporting those directly impacted and building a popular base through proactive assistance, rather than defining itself solely as a partisan group characterized by anti-Israeli sentiments. The Muslim Brotherhood’s significant presence in Jordan has profoundly influenced the movement's perspective on Israel, particularly given that nearly half of Jordan's population—around three million—are Palestinians. It serves the Brotherhood's interests to adopt a populist stance toward Israel, aligning with the sentiments of many supporters who are directly affected by the ongoing conflict. Following the Black September incident, where secular militants hijacked aircraft and attempted a coup in Jordan, the Brotherhood chose to support King Hussein and the Hashemite monarchy, which was working to normalize relations with Israel after the 1967 War. Consequently, the Brotherhood moderated its criticism of Israel throughout the mid-1970s, until the Palestinian resistance began to adopt a more Islamic approach to the conflict. Today, the Brotherhood continues to embrace a populist view of the Arab-Israeli conflict, recognizing that its criticism of Israel must reflect the Islamic direction of their movement. This strategy serves to advance their social goals of regional unity. However, the Brotherhood faces a complex challenge in balancing its relationship with Hamas, which draws inspiration from the Brotherhood’s ideology. Hamas's covenant famously quotes al-Banna: “Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam obliterates it, just as it obliterated others before it.” While the Brotherhood maintains a close, albeit unofficial, relationship with Hamas, it is acutely aware of the negative perceptions associated with being linked to a group known for its violent actions, including terror and rocket attacks against Israel. Thus, while the Brotherhood remains a vocal critic of Israel, it must carefully navigate the risks of being associated with overt violence, particularly against innocent civilians. The Muslim Brotherhood's support for Hamas is nuanced; while there are ties, recent events have strained this relationship. The Brotherhood has also adeptly utilized established institutions to gradually pursue its own objectives. This strategy has proven effective, suggesting that they will likely avoid direct conflict with Israel, opting instead to cultivate popular support and engage in non-violent resistance.
Muslim Brotherhood's Perspective on Israel
Founded in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has a deep understanding of the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel. The complexities and practicalities surrounding this agreement were significant, and it was met with widespread opposition from Egyptian citizens, who largely rejected the deal. Nevertheless, President Sadat had limited options for reclaiming the Sinai territory lost in the 1967 war, leading him to spend over a decade in negotiations with Israel to restore the status quo. Tragically, Sadat was ultimately assassinated by militants from Egyptian Islamic Jihad, who opposed the peace process, underscoring the profound emotions tied to this contentious issue among the populace. Both Mubarak and Morsi have upheld the peace agreement, ensuring that Sinai remains demilitarized. Although recent incidents of lawlessness and kidnapping have prompted Egyptian forces to enter the region with light armor and infantry—with Israel's concurrence—there have been no significant large-scale clashes between Israel and Egypt. Nevertheless, a substantial portion of the Egyptian populace continues to reject the agreement on ideological grounds, leading to numerous petitions in the court system aimed at nullifying it, which places additional pressure on the Muslim Brotherhood. As an opposition group, the Muslim Brotherhood has historically opposed peace with Israel and has made several notable declarations to that effect. However, it is important to recognize that there are other entities with greater influence over Islamic jurisprudence. The Brotherhood is largely beholden to clerics and the millennium-old seat of Islamic scholarship, al-Azhar University. While the Muslim Brotherhood has its own Guidance Bureau responsible for organizing the group and streamlining policies, the Supreme Guide, Muhammad Bad’ie, oversees thirteen members with Islamic educational backgrounds. He also provides political direction, modernizing the group's objectives and interpretations. Due to the diverse discourse within the organization and its emphasis on practical application over theoretical debate, the council often refers to existing fatwas that align more closely with classical Islamic jurisprudence, such as those found at institutions like Al-Azhar. The Muslim Brotherhood maintains a strong grassroots presence and is skilled at translating social and economic issues into political activism. However, various other Islamic organizations adopt a more global and historical perspective, further complicating the landscape of Islamic thought and activism in the region. While the Muslim Brotherhood continues to address Palestinian suffering, referencing UN resolutions regarding Israel and advocating for a return to the 1967 borders, classical Islamic scholars focus on ijtihad, the legal interpretation of religious law grounded in the Quran. In the context of the Israeli conflict, scholars from al-Azhar emphasize the Quranic example of Muhammad signing a peace agreement with the ‘infidel’ Meccans during a moment of vulnerability at Hudaybiyya, drawing parallels to contemporary situations. They strive to adhere strictly to Quranic interpretation, even when their conclusions complicate current issues—a distinction that can place pure jurisprudence at odds with the political ambitions of the Muslim Brotherhood. At the signing of the Egypt-Israel peace agreement, prominent Islamic cleric Jad al-Haqq invoked the example of Hudaybiyya to support Egypt's treaty, arguing that such an agreement was appropriate for regaining lost territory and beneficial for the Muslim community. Other scholars disagreed with al-Haqq, using similar Quranic foundations to support their views. However, it is noteworthy that none of these prominent scholars are officially aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, allowing them the freedom to research and analyze without the constraints of an organization that values party discipline. The Muslim Brotherhood has gained political power but still relies on clerics for official Islamic jurisprudence. Therefore, it is crucial to understand which scholars the Brotherhood recognizes and cites, rather than solely focusing on the research from the Guidance Bureau. For instance, classical Islam outlines five situations in which hudna (a temporary cessation of hostilities) may be authorized:
- Military weakness (du’f) of Muslims
Distance (bu’d) of the battlefield from the Muslim camp
3. Force majeure (mazilah) – events beyond the control of the Muslims
4. Severe shortage (qillah) of weaponry, equipment, food supplies, and especially water
5. Fear of annihilation (halak) by the enemy’s strike force[^28]
Islamic law stipulates that only hudna is applicable when engaging with non-Muslims, and that peace will cease once the Muslim entity is strong enough to reassert its control, with a maximum duration of ten years.[^29] While the West often views agreements as relatively permanent, many Islamic scholars openly discuss the limited timeframe of such accords, emphasizing that Quranic principles take precedence over any official peace with Israel. The Muslim Brotherhood, as both an organization and an opposition group, has traditionally opposed Israel in support of the Palestinian cause, aligning its declarations with popular sentiment. However, as a political entity now leading a nation with much at stake should war erupt, the Brotherhood is currently reassessing Islamic jurisprudence to refine its stance against Israel while distancing itself from more radical factions that could jeopardize peace.
Muslim Brotherhood Practicalities
The Muslim Brotherhood takes pride in what it perceives as a moderate vision of Islamic benevolence, advocating for freedom from corruption and immorality. However, it's much easier to advocate for these ambitions as an opposition group than to lead a nation, where one is held accountable for every decision, as well as for social, economic, and political issues, and the actions of groups and individuals even loosely connected to the organization. To this end, the Muslim Brotherhood established the Freedom and Justice Party in February 2011 to maintain a separation between its social and political agendas. Members of the FJP typically include educated, politically active young professionals who can project a devout Muslim image to their constituents while simultaneously presenting a modernized and progressive face of the Brotherhood to the West. Some individuals within the movement focus on engaging with Western counterparts, while others adopt a discourse that resonates more with their grassroots supporters. In a particularly awkward moment following the attacks on the American Embassy, the Brotherhood's Arabic Twitter feed praised the protests, vowed to continue resisting American hegemony, and called for a victory for the Prophet. Meanwhile, the English feed aimed at American audiences showcased a moderate narrative and a disavowal of violence, prompting a US response of, “...By the way, have you checked out your own Arabic feeds?” “I hope you know we read those too.”[^30] This contrasting message is crucial for understanding the Muslim Brotherhood’s perspective on Israel. On one hand, the Brotherhood must consistently address what is arguably the most pressing foreign policy issue for their supporters, which necessitates an anti-Israeli stance. Moreover, the Brotherhood itself does not recognize Israel. For example, Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohammed Badie sharply criticized the peace deal between Israel and Hamas that Morsi himself helped broker, stating, “The enemy knows nothing but the language of force. Be aware of the grand deception with which they depict peace accords.” He followed this with calls to resume jihad and reclaim Jerusalem.[^31] If the Brotherhood were not in power, this would likely be their response to any agreement. However, as a governing entity, the Muslim Brotherhood also recognizes the practical need to maintain peace. While these conflicting messages often clash, they reflect a departure from the previously strict discipline of the Brotherhood’s communications. This evolution serves as a survival mechanism, allowing the Brotherhood to tailor its messages to different audiences. Morsi himself, the former chairman of the Freedom and Justice Party, stepped down from office in a gesture of non-partisanship, though it is difficult to see this as a genuine sign of separation. Morsi has pledged to uphold the Israeli peace agreement, and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is careful to honor international commitments. Interestingly, many within the MB emphasize that they are merely maintaining the status quo, even if they do not fully endorse it. This strategy allows them to save face while avoiding the risk of escalating tensions with their neighbor. Morsi has also reiterated that he will not take any actions to challenge the agreement, despite criticism over reports that Egypt has moved anti-aircraft weaponry into the Sinai, potentially violating the terms of the pact. Whether or not Egypt coordinated properly with Israel regarding its deployment of light infantry and armored units, international peacekeepers remain in the Sinai to ensure that any Egyptian military action would need to be both forceful and deliberate—a scenario that seems highly unlikely given the multitude of pressing issues Egypt currently faces. Additionally, the August 2012 attack by Islamic militants that resulted in the deaths of sixteen Egyptian troops strained relations between Hamas and Egypt, underscoring the challenges the Muslim Brotherhood encounters as it transitions into a political force. The mobilization in the Sinai is a direct response to that attack, which has facilitated Morsi's enforcement of the ceasefire terms with Israel. This includes flooding smuggling tunnels, regulating Gazan imports, and monitoring the flow of rockets and rocket materials into Gaza. These actions would typically invite strong criticism, often seen as the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) abandoning its sister movement, Hamas. However, Morsi has highlighted the deadly attack and emphasized the need for a more balanced policy toward Israel, particularly if Egypt wishes to remain relevant as a mediator in the region. Morsi and the MB face significant domestic challenges, including an economic crisis, widespread protests, and an alarming unemployment rate that devastates Egyptian communities. Two major incidents along the border in 2012 profoundly impacted Egypt’s relations with Israel. The first occurred in August 2012, when militants from Gaza attacked an Egyptian base, resulting in the deaths of 16 Egyptian soldiers. The attackers subsequently crossed into Israeli territory in stolen armored vehicles, where they were killed in airstrikes and a subsequent firefight with Israel Defense Forces (IDF) border units. This tragic event not only struck a blow to the Egyptian military and intelligence agencies but also left Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood appearing weak and incapable, jeopardizing their leadership role in the resistance against Israel. In response, Morsi dismissed top military and civilian authorities in the Sinai and deployed light armor and infantry units to the region, pledging to reassert Egypt's sovereignty. Yet, the Muslim Brotherhood, keen to uphold its reputation for competence, faced public embarrassment as numerous statements of condolence from around the world simultaneously expressed hope that Morsi could regain control over his own territory. Most of the perpetrators were not officially identified, but the state-sponsored media outlet Al-Ahram al-Araby plans to publish an investigative report in April 2013 that will present evidence of the involvement of Hamas’ al-Qassam Brigade. This evidence will include details on operation planning, logistical support, and mortar fire originating from Gaza. The attack highlighted the state of Egypt's military preparedness, yet the responses and statements from both the Egyptian government and the Muslim Brotherhood were not only contradictory but also perceived as irrational, drawing mockery from the international community. While Hamas offered condolences, they prefaced their statement with comments about Zionism, which came across as insincere to the Egyptians. Furthermore, when Egypt closed the Rafah border crossing in the aftermath of the incident, Hamas strongly criticized the Egyptian government, asserting that Zionists now controlled Egypt. Egyptian reports indicated that mortar fire came from Gaza during the attack, and as the governing authority in the territory, Hamas bears ultimate responsibility, regardless of whether they directly ordered the assault on Egypt. In response to Hamas’ accusations, the Muslim Brotherhood claimed on its website that the attack was orchestrated by Israel’s Mossad, yet they provided no supporting evidence. This left many questioning the Brotherhood's grasp of their own political situation and their understanding of the regional dynamics. While this claim may have resonated with their popular base, it raised concerns among the international community regarding their rationality and preparedness. Finally, Mourad Mowafy, the head of Egyptian Intelligence, acknowledged that they had received prior warning about the attack from Israeli intelligence. While the IDF adjusted their forces and took necessary precautions, it appeared that Egyptian forces were not adequately prepared. If this intelligence reached the Muslim Brotherhood through the military chain of command, it could be argued that they were naïve about the threat posed by Islamic militants. They seemed to assume that their identity as Muslims and their stance against Israel would render them immune to such attacks. If this assumption holds true, the incident will compel the Muslim Brotherhood to reassess their relationships not only with militant groups but also with their former allies, including Hamas. The relationship with Hamas remains tense, and as Egypt intensifies its efforts to dismantle smuggling tunnels and adopts a firmer stance toward its neighbor, it must continually navigate the delicate balance of being perceived as an anti-Israeli stronghold while maintaining peace along what has traditionally been its quietest border. A significant factor influencing relations with Israel has been Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood's involvement in negotiating a cease-fire during Operation Pillar of Defense. This eight-day operation began with a targeted airstrike that killed Hamas military chief Ahmed Jabari, triggering a sustained campaign of airstrikes and rocket attacks. With Israel unable to negotiate directly with Hamas and strained relations with Turkey—previously a mediator—Egypt stepped in to facilitate cease-fire discussions. Initially, Morsi condemned the "Israeli aggression," echoing sentiments from other Middle Eastern leaders. However, as negotiations progressed, he moderated his rhetoric, allowing Egyptian military officials to take the lead, supported by the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood. As Israeli troops amassed on the Gaza border in preparation for a potential ground invasion, an agreement was ultimately reached, offering certain guarantees of peace to both sides. Israel agreed to halt all airstrikes, suspend targeted killings, and engage in further negotiations regarding the sea blockade, while Hamas committed to ending rocket fire and enforcing these terms on allied groups like Islamic Jihad. Egypt pledged to eliminate smuggling routes into Gaza with international support, a move that aimed to appease the global community and maintain peace with Israel. Morsi received praise from figures such as Hillary Clinton and Benjamin Netanyahu for his role in these negotiations, relishing Egypt's newfound strategic position while publicly supporting Hamas. Although the Muslim Brotherhood, as an opposition group, would not typically have taken an active role in this conflict, Morsi seized the opportunity to highlight Egypt's importance as a strategic partner on the world stage and to present himself as an impartial representative of the nation.
Egypt’s Domestic Situation
Understanding Egypt's domestic situation and economic crisis is crucial to grasping how the country will navigate its relationships with Israel and the rest of the world. Following his successful mediation of the peace agreement during Operation Pillar of Defense, Morsi declared a sweeping set of presidential powers on November 22, 2012. These powers allowed him to issue decrees that could override the judicial system, countermand previous laws, and, ironically, grant himself more authority than Mubarak had wielded in the name of ‘revolution.’ This announcement likely aimed to solidify the Muslim Brotherhood's power base and leverage international recognition to swiftly establish a government. However, the domestic backlash was immediate; thousands of protesters flooded the streets nationwide, and for many liberal and secular groups, their fears that Morsi would govern with an Islamic bias and authoritarianism were confirmed. Western governments viewed this power grab as a troubling sign of rising Islamic fundamentalism taking hold in the nation, leading to the suspension of crucial IMF relief negotiations amid escalating domestic unrest. Morsi responded defiantly to the criticism, labeling the protesters as “remnants of the regime.” However, he eventually made some concessions, easing certain absolute power stipulations while hastily pushing the Egyptian constitution through an Islamic-dominated congress. The language used was ambiguous regarding the extent to which Sharia law and clerics would influence the judicial system, as well as the status of the three major religions and women's rights. Secular opposition groups argue that Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood miscalculated their control over Egypt, leading to ongoing protests that highlight the prevailing rhetoric, unclear legal interpretations, and the state's increasing weakness. Trust in the Muslim Brotherhood's agenda among opposition groups is unlikely to be restored, and several protests have seen Salafi and fundamentalist Islamist factions joining forces with their liberal counterparts. Salafi cleric Sheikh Darwish expressed, “Of course we are unhappy with the developments and Mr. Morsi’s choices,” emphasizing that a shared vision of an Islamic nation does not always overshadow political differences. Alongside the political turmoil, Egypt’s economic situation is dire. Two years of stagnation have brought the nation to a standstill, with an economic growth rate of only 2.2% juxtaposed against an inflation rate of 8.7%. The once-thriving tourism sector and large business infrastructure have been devastated over the past two years. Unsustainable food and fuel subsidies, which accounted for 27% of government spending in 2012, have caused Egypt’s budget deficit to soar, leading to a capital outflow that forced Morsi to freeze overseas transactions. With few options to contain the spiraling crisis, Morsi has turned to the IMF for support, but a late 2012 agreement fell through when Egypt reneged on promised tax increases. Analyst Michael Singh from the Washington Institute notes that Egypt will continue to spiral into monetary collapse until it can engage the opposition in agreements and broaden decision-making beyond Brotherhood control. He observes, “The Brotherhood currently appears more eager to fight ideological battles than to promote political reconciliation and advance national interests.” The current economic crisis in Egypt is unlikely to be resolved in the near future, especially without a concerted effort across party lines to find a solution.
Analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood
Since the revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood has occasionally excelled in showcasing their strengths and impressing the international community. However, their aspiration to lead a sovereign nation has, in many ways, turned into a nightmare. The economy is in freefall, civil disobedience is rampant, and violent protests are overwhelming both the military and civil law enforcement. Whether this outcome was anticipated by the Muslim Brotherhood after their long pursuit of power over the past eighty years is beside the point. What truly matters is how they navigate the diverse challenges at the domestic level while balancing their traditional ties with various Islamist groups and their obligations to maintain peace with Israel—these factors are crucial to their survival. When President Morsi was elected, he won by a narrow margin, primarily because he ran against Ahmed Shafik, a figure closely associated with the Mubarak regime. Polls and interviews across Egypt reveal that, aside from the Muslim Brotherhood's own supporters, many Egyptians cast their votes with the hope that the Brotherhood would serve as a transitional force rather than out of genuine agreement with Morsi and the Brotherhood's policies. This sentiment contributed to Morsi's slim victory (51.7% to Shafik’s 48.3%) against an unpopular representative of autocracy. In his inaugural speech, Morsi outlined a range of ambitious goals, including the release of the blind sheikh, Omar Abdel Rahman, who was convicted for his involvement in the first World Trade Center bombing. Meanwhile, the newly formed, Islamist-dominated congress faced scrutiny as parliamentary sessions were broadcast on “Voice of the People” television. These broadcasts revealed elected officials engaging in personal attacks and bombastic rhetoric, often discussing topics that were irrelevant to the pressing needs of the Egyptian populace during this critical period of transition. These early signs of the Brotherhood’s mindset and outlook are concerning, and Morsi’s domestic power decree, issued at the peak of his international acclaim as a negotiator, ultimately backfired. It will be challenging for the Brotherhood to assume a significant international role without the support of any opposition group, especially as the domestic situation continues to deteriorate. Historically, governments around the world have often turned their attention abroad when faced with insurmountable domestic challenges, and Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood may find this dynamic working in their favor. Currently, Israel is focused on maintaining the status quo in regional relations, holding off on long-term planning until power structures stabilize. While some Israeli foreign policy experts, like Benny Morris and Avi Shlaim, criticize this cautious approach as inaction, Israel is wise to refrain from fully backing Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood too soon. Such support could alienate the resilient secular and liberal factions that oppose the new regime. At the same time, Israel cannot afford to isolate the Muslim Brotherhood if they manage to navigate their political and economic crises. This moment presents an opportunity for Israel to forge sustainable agreements while Morsi's grip on power remains tenuous. Anti-Israeli sentiment persists in many circles, and Morsi has faced numerous accusations of blatant anti-Semitism. However, as power struggles continue to unfold across the Middle East, Israel has the chance to establish necessary relations with pragmatic security figures and moderate politicians, while also quietly supporting liberal opposition groups. The Muslim Brotherhood's extensive social reach and regional influence make Israel's policy towards Egypt critically important. Remaining cordial while distancing itself from autocracy will help ensure that Israel does not become a focal point of Egyptian resentment or a rallying symbol for unification. The Muslim Brotherhood’s evolution from a grassroots Islamic opposition movement to a civil power presents significant challenges; they can no longer position themselves as the oppressed and will be held accountable for their decisions by their constituents. It remains uncertain whether the Brotherhood will adjust its localized approach to building an Islamic society and shift toward a comprehensive policy that outlines clear regional and international objectives. However, there has never been a better opportunity for Israel to emerge as a regional leader, influence public opinion, forge future alliances, and support the liberal elements within the region—all while maintaining a stable relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood. It is highly unlikely that the Brotherhood will instigate any direct conflict with Israel, given the numerous international nations and organizations upon which they depend to stabilize their nation. Moreover, the Brotherhood has recognized the advantages of patience and a long-term vision, applying gradual pressure based on popular support, and they are likely to continue this strategy regarding Israel. While Israel cannot dictate whether its neighbors recognize it as a legitimate nation in the Middle East, it can position itself as a de facto leader as other regional powers grapple with legitimacy and emerge from the Arab Spring stronger than ever.